Reconsidering absentmindedness by Potters, Jos A.M.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The version of the following full text has not yet been defined or was untraceable and may
differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/18716
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS 
UNIVERSITY OF NIJMEGEN The Netherlands
Reconsidering Absentmindedness
Jos AM Potters
Report No. 9911 (March 1999)
DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS 
UNIVERSITY OF NIJMEGEN 
Toernooiveld 
6525 ED Nijmegen 
The Netherlands
R e c o n s id e r in g  A b s e n tm in d e d n e s s
Abstract The paper is m eant to  give an overview and a critical com m ent on the 
paper of Piccione and R ubinstein (1997“) on decision problem s w ith im perfect recall 
and the reactions to  th a t  paper in the same issue of Games and Economic Behavior. 
I t  investigates the  logical soundness of the concepts in troduced by various au thors to  
cure the ‘absentm inded driver paradox’. I t poses the  feasibility question ‘Is it possible 
(allowed) to  deviate in the m iddle of an inform ation set a t a stochastically  chosen tim e 
m om ent t ?’. The paper shows th a t tim e inconsistent decision rules are, in general, 
b e tte r th an  optim al behavior rules, if the  deviations are possible, and th a t the paradox 
disappears, if the  deviations are not possible. The paper contains an explicit analysis of 
the  absentm inded driver story  under three kinds of deviations. The analysis shows th a t 
adding to  the model ‘external possibilities to  solve the paradox’ causes an excavation 
of the inform ation structu re  of the original model (the ‘absentm indedness’).
Key words: Decision problem  w ith im perfect recall, tim e consistency, absentm inded­
ness
I n t r o d u c t io n
Em erging from absentm indedness a decision m aker will usually ask him self four ques­
tions nam ely “W here am  I ?” , “W hat tim e is it ?” , “W hat was I doing ?” and “Is 
there som ething b e tte r to  do ?” . These are, in a nutshell, the  issues addressed in 
Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) and the reactions to  th is paper in the same issue of 
Games and Economic Behavior. Given the im perfect recall (absentm indedness) the 
first question— ‘in w hat decision node am  I ’— cannot be answered completely. The 
decision m aker knows the inform ation set he is in, bu t a priori nothing more. The 
second question makes only sense, if we have a sensible notion of t im ing . The mini­
m al condition for such a concept is th a t ‘tim e ' increases along paths. If we know w hat 
‘tim e’ is, the  answers to  the first two questions are quite related. So we will assume 
th a t the decision m aker does not know the ‘tim e’ either. The th ird  question asks if 
the  decision m aker can rem em ber the s tra tegy  he was executing. We will assume th a t 
th is is the case. We shall call th is s tra tegy  the incumbent strategy. The last question is 
the  m ain topic of all the  papers on ‘absentm indedness’. If there is no b e tte r course of 
action, the  incum bent stra tegy  is called time consistent . If the  decision m aker cannot
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rem em ber the incum bent strategy, the  last question is, of course, senseless bu t, even if 
he rem em bers the incum bent strategy, the  question can only be answered if we know 
the  set of alternatives the decision m aker has, the  ways in which he can deviate.
Piccione and R ubinstein argue th a t in a special class of decision problem s w ith im ­
perfect recall—decision problem s w ith absentmindedness —the in terp re ta tion  of the 
modelling tools in the theory  of m ulti-step decision problem s (inform ation sets and 
behavior strategies) is am biguous or incom plete and th a t paradoxes easily arise. The 
authors themselves form ulated an example of a very simple decision problem  with 
absentmindedness  in which the use of stan d ard  techniques lead to  counterintuitive or 
even paradoxical results. Particularly, th is exam ple—the absentminded driver para­
dox, as it is called— got a lot of a tten tion  in the subsequent reactions to  the paper. 
A m ulti-step decision problem  exhibits absentmindedness  if there is a p a th  in the de­
cision tree th a t intersects a t least one of the  inform ation sets more th an  once. This is 
a very special case of a decision problem  w ith imperfect recall. Imperfect recall occurs 
if two different pa ths lead to  the  same inform ation set and the paths intersect differ­
ent inform ation sets or contain different moves (in Section 1 we give a more explicit 
definition).
Reactions to  a paradox are predictable. Some people will argue th a t  there is no p ara­
dox and th a t the counter-intuitive results are the  consequence of bad reasoning . The 
papers of A um ann, H art and P erry  (1997“,19976) and Gilboa (1997) belong to  this 
category. O ther people will take the problem  seriously and try  to  form ulate a more en­
compassing theory  for m ulti-step decision problem s. The papers of Grove and H alpern 
(1997), H alpern (1997), B attigalli (1997) belong to  the  second category.
Clearly, b o th  approaches have their value. If the paradox is, indeed, the result of bad 
thinking, it is not necessary to  com plicate decision theory; if not, som ething has to  
be changed in the classical in terp re ta tion  of decision making.
Aum ann, H art and P erry  (1997“,19976) could make the ir point, as the analysis of 
Piccione and R ubinstein is— to  say the  least—not impeccable. The papers of the sec­
ond category (Grove and H alpern (1997), H alpern (1997), B attigalli (1997)) propose 
m any new, partia lly  overlapping ideas to  ‘solve the paradox’ and it m ight make sense 
to  bring some s tructu re  in the  set of proposals.
In th is paper we will overview the b a ttle  field, help the wounded and bury  the dead. We 
shall reconsider the analysis of Piccione and R ubinstein, A um ann et al. and Gilboa.
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We also give our own analysis of the absentm inded driver problem  and connect this 
solution, where possible, w ith the concepts proposed by other authors. We will try  
to  place the absentm inded driver sto ry  in a context where the counter-intuitive re­
sults find their n a tu ra l place, are no longer surprising. This is the paradox of science: 
although surprising, counter-intuitive results stir the intellectual potentials of the sci­
entific com m unity (see the m any reactions to  Piccione and R ubinstein), their efforts 
are aim ed a t tak ing  away the feeling of surprise. Most people cannot s tan d  a para­
doxical situation  for a long time.
Section 1 gives a synopsis of m ulti-step decision theory. We give special a tten tion  to  
concepts th a t are im portan t when considering absentm indedness, namely:
(i) the  concept of t im ing ,
(ii) the  concept of deviation ,
(iii) the  in terp re ta tion  of behavior strategies,
(iv) the  feasibility of deviations,
(v) the idea of forming beliefs and Bayesian updating .
Section 2 restates a slightly generalized version of the absentm inded driver sto ry  and 
gives a first analysis of the  problem . We com pare our analysis w ith the m ethods of 
Piccione and R ubinstein, A um ann et al. and Gilboa. Section 3 and 4 gives an analysis 
of the  generalized absentm inded driver story. We shall see th a t tim e inconsistent 
solutions are, in general, b e tte r th an  optim al behavior strategies, if we assume th a t 
the  decision m aker has a m ethod (a device) to  choose a random ized tim e m om ent 
to  reconsider. Section 5 contains our conclusions. The m ost im portan t issue in this 
section is the  feasibility of a deviation.
1. A  S y n o p s is  o f  M u l t i - s te p  D e c is io n  T h e o ry
The subsections 1.1—1.3 introduce the basic definitions. Subsection 1.4 introduces the 
idea of decision problem s w ith t im ing . In subsection 1.5 we consider two concepts 
of tim e consistency and the last two subsections are devoted to  optim al strategies, 
forming beliefs and Bayesian updating. A part from subsection 1.4 all the  m aterial in 
th is section is standard . We repeat it as it gives us the opportun ity  to  fix the  no tation  
and to  em phasize some ideas th a t will become im portan t in the next sections.
1.1 M u l t i - s te p  d e c is io n  p ro b le m s .
A m ulti-step decision problem  is usually modeled by a decision tree. I t consists of
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•  a finite rooted tree (V ,A ,r ) .  (V ,A )  is a tree, a connected graph w ithout cycles. 
r G V  is a node called the root, denoting the sta rtin g  point of the decision process. 
We assume th a t the arcs are oriented from the root. By the choice of this orientation  
we ob tain  a directed tree. For each node x  G N  we denote the  set of arcs a G A  
s ta rtin g  at x  by A (x). For a set of nodes X  C V  we w rite A ( X ) for the set of arcs 
sta rtin g  from one of the points of X .
•  The set V  is partitioned  into three subsets Z , C  and  D. The set Z  consists of the  
nodes z G V  w ith  A (z )  =  0, the term inal nodes of the tree. Here the decision process 
stops. The nodes in C  represent the decision nodes where a ‘move of n a tu re ' takes 
place. In  the nodes of D  the  decision m aker determ ines the direction in which the 
process is continued.
•  For every node c G C  a probability  m easure Ye on A(c) is given. In a point c of C  
a chance m echanism  (with probability  d istribu tion  Ye > 0 ) determ ines the arc along 
which the process is continued.
•  A u tility  function u: Z  ^  IR is given. The num ber u(z)  describes the decision 
m aker's appreciation for reaching z G Z .
•  A partitio n  J  of D  is given. The elements X  of J  are called information sets . The 
decision m aker is assum ed to  be unable to  distinguish the points in one inform ation 
set X  g J  bu t he can make a d istinction between different inform ation sets.
•  For each inform ation set X  G J  the  set A (X ) of arcs sta rtin g  in a point of X  is 
partitioned  into m oves . The set of all moves in X  is denoted by M  (X  ). I t is assumed 
th a t for every x  G X  and every move m  G M (X ) the intersection of A (x) and m  
consists of exactly  one arc. This arc is followed if the decision m aker chooses move m  
and  he happens to  be in the point x  G X .
I t  is the decision m aker’s task  to  decide, based on the information he has at the 
m om ent of his decision, which move to  choose in each of the  inform ation sets and by 
doing so, he generates a lo tte ry  on the term inal nodes, the outcome of the decision 
process. We assume th a t the decision m aker's appreciation for a lo ttery  on the set Z  
w ith  probability  d istribu tion  {IP (z)}z£Z is given by ^ zeZ IP (z) u (z). The decision 
m aker is aim ing a t m axim ization of this expression (expected u tility  m axim ization).
We will call a p a th  from the root to  any of the nodes a history . So, a history  consists 
of a non-em pty finite string (of odd length) v0 =  r , a \ , v \ , . . . , a k , v k where Vi G V  and 
ai =  (vi_ i,  vi ) G A  is an arc of the  tree. A h istory  is a possible way along which the
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process can proceed. As (V, A) is a tree, histories are uniquely determ ined by (and 
can be identified with) their last node a ^ .1
1.2 T y p e s  o f  d e c is io n  t r e e s
There are different types of decision trees.
(i) A decision tree exhibits perfect information  if every inform ation set consists of 
one node. U nder perfect inform ation, only the chance moves generate uncerta in ty  
and this kind of problem s can be solved by backward induction. If at least one 
inform ation set consists of more th an  one node, we have a decision problem  with 
imperfect information.
(ii) In decision problem s w ith im perfect inform ation one can make a distinction be­
tween problem s w ith perfect and imperfect recall. A decision problem  exhibits perfect 
recall if for every inform ation set X  g I  and every pair of nodes x , y  G X  the  following 
sta tem ent holds:
if the  p a th  from the root r  to  x  intersects another (not necessarily differ­
ent) inform ation set X ' and in th is inform ation set the move m  G M (X ') 
supports the  p a th  to  x  (m eaning th a t only an arc in m  leads to  the node 
x)  then  the p a th  from r  to  y  intersects X ' too  and the same move m  
supports the  p a th  from r  to  y .
(iii) Perfect recall excludes, in particular, the  possibility th a t one p a th  intersects the 
same inform ation set more th an  one tim e. A decision problem  exhibits absentmind­
edness if some p a th  intersects one of the  inform ation sets more often th an  once.
1.3 D if fe re n t ty p e s  o f  s t r a te g ie s
A pure stra tegy  s  is a rule th a t makes a choice from the available moves, one in each 
inform ation set. Therefore, s: J  ^  M  =  U x e j"  M (X ) w ith s (X ) G M (X ) for every 
X  g J . The set S  of pure strategies is equal to  X e j  M (X ). If a pure s tra tegy  s is 
chosen, the  chance moves generate a lo tte ry  on Z .
A mixed strategy is a probability  m easure on the set of pure strategies. A mixed 
stra tegy  is supposed to  be implemented  by first random izing over the  pure strategies 
and to  follow the selected pure strategy. This pure stra tegy  generates (by the chance 
moves) a lo tte ry  on the set Z  and as there is a com plete order on th is finite set of
1 We do not follow the latest trend to take histories as the primitives of the model and to derive the decision 
tree from the set of histories. Moreover, our histories contain nodes as well as arcs and are never empty.
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lotteries, it makes no sense to  choose a mixed strategy. There is a pure stra tegy  th a t 
gives an optim al outcome.
A different kind of s tra tegy  is a behavior strategy. A behavior stra tegy  b assigns to  
each inform ation set a s tra tegy  com ponent bX , a probability  d istribu tion  over M  (X  ). 
The im plem entation of a behavior s tra tegy  can be done by a set of agents, one for 
each inform ation set X , who represents the  decision m aker in the inform ation set X  
and im plem ents the  behavior com ponent bX . These agents are dum m ies in the  sense 
th a t they  do w hat they  are told to  do. The decision m aker gives the instructions 
and coordinates their actions (behavior com ponents). They play an essential p a rt 
in case of im perfect recall because it is hard  to  swallow th a t an—in all o ther respect 
ra tional—decision m aker forgets some relevant inform ation. In case of agents it is eas­
ier to  accept th a t some agent did not get all the  inform ation or has more inform ation 
th an  the decision maker. In inform ation sets w ith absentm indedness some authors 
(Piccione and R ubinstein (1997“), G ilboa (1997)), introduce more than one agent in 
one and the same information set. The term s ‘m ultiselves’, ‘tw ins’ and ‘tw in-self’ are 
used. The ‘tw in’-m etaphor seems to  be the favorite, as folklore says th a t  ‘tw ins need 
not to  com m unicate to  coordinate their actions'. Thereby, tw ins have a m ysterious 
com m unication channel th a t norm al people do not have.
The set of behavior strategies B  equals the  set ü x e j  A (M (X )). Note th a t a pure 
behavior s tra tegy  is the  same as a pure strategy: taking in each inform ation set X  
one move m  in M  (X  ) w ith probability  1 is the same as taking in each inform ation 
set X  the  move s (X ): =  m.
In a decision problem  w ithout absentm indedness a behavior s tra tegy  b ‘can be asso­
c ia ted ’ w ith a mixed strategy a b. Let us do th is explicitly. If b =  {bX } is a behavior 
strategy, the  m ixed stra tegy  a b pu ts the following weight on the pure stra tegy  s:
a b(s): =  U x e J  bx ( s (X )) .
Also, in decision problem s with absentm indedness one can associate b w ith a b bu t the 
following proposition ( th a t makes the whole operation senseful) does not hold. 
P r o p o s i t io n  1 In a decision problem without absentmindedness every behavior 
strategy b generates the same probability distribution on the set Z  (generates the same 
outcome) as the associated mixed strategy ab.
P ro o f :  We m ust prove th a t, for each z G Z , the probability  th a t z G Z  is reached 
is the  same under b and a b. Let P  be the set of nodes on the p a th  from r  to  z. Let 
C p  be the  intersection C  n  P  and D P =  D  n  P . The m ost im portan t observation is 
th a t different points of D p  are from different information sets .
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To reach the  node z  ‘n a tu re ' m ust choose the ‘right m ove' in each node c G Cp  and 
bX  m ust choose the ‘right m ove’, if X  n  P  =  0. So, if b is used, the chance to  reach z 
is
P  (z,b)  =  n Ye(right move in c) * bX  (right move in X  n  P ).
eeCp xrP=0
We can take the product as all the chance mechanisms along P  are independent .
If ab is used, we have to  m ultiply the  chance th a t  a pure s tra tegy  s is chosen th a t 
supports the p a th  from r  to  z (i.e., s (X ) =  right move in X  n  P , whenever X  n  P  =
0— we call such a stra tegy  s a supporting strategy) and Ye(right move in c).
eeCp
By the definition of a b(s), the  chance th a t a supporting  stra tegy  s is chosen is equal 
to
T [  bX (right move in X  n  P ) * bX ( s ( X )).
X rP =0 XrP=0
To be a supporting  strategy, s(X  ) can be any move in inform ation sets not intersecting
P  and  m ust be the ‘right move in X  ’ for inform ation sets X  intersecting P . If we
num ber the inform ation sets not intersecting P  by X 1, . . .  X q and  m i G M  (X i ), we
have q q
I I  bX i (mi ) = n [  bX i (m i)] =  1
i=1 i=1 mi£M (X i)
The probability  th a t ab chooses a supporting  stra tegy  to  reach z  is 
bX  (right move in X  n  P ).
X rP =0
The behavior s tra tegy  b and the mixed stra tegy  a b pu t the same weight on every 
z G Z . <1
C o ro l la ry :  In  decision problems without absentmindedness the set of behavior 
strategies can be identified with a subset of the set of mixed strategies and there is a 
pure (behavior) strategy that is optimal.
If the decision problem  has perfect recall we also have the converse of the  corollary 
(Theorem  of K uhn (1953)).
For each mixed strategy s there is a behavior strategy bs generating the same outcome 
(lottery on the terminal nodes) as s does.
A well known result in the  same spirit as the previous proposition states: 
P r o p o s i t io n  2. In  decision problems with perfect recall the proportions o f  the 
probabilities to reach x  or x ' , IP(x, b) : IP (x ' , b) is not dependent on b, i f  x  and x '  are 
in  the same information set X  and this proportion makes sense.
P ro o f :  Let P  and P ' be the path s from the roo t r  to  x  and x ' , respectively. Then
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IP (x, b) =  Ye (right move in c) bY  (right move in Y  n  P  ).
eeP Y r P =0
For the node x '  we get a sim ilar expression:
IP(x ' , b) =  Ye' (right move in c') bY i (right move in Y '  n  P') .
e'eP' Y'rP'=0
Because of perfect recall P  and P ' intersect the same inform ation sets Y  and for the 
same reason the 'rig h t move in Y  n  P  and in Y  n  P ' are the  same. This means
IP(x, b) : IP(x',  b) =  Ye(right move in c) : Ye' (right move in c')
eeP e'eP'
if n Y r P = 0  bY (right move in Y  n  P ) =  0. <
C o ro lla ry : In  decision problems with perfect recall there is only one way to assess 
well founded (consistent) beliefs in  information sets.
For decision problem s w ith absentm indedness the implementation  of a behavior s tra t­
egy is another point th a t m ust be clarified. In a decision problem  w ithout absentm ind­
edness the  behavior com ponent bX can be activated (the chance m echanism  is pu t 
to  work), when the inform ation set X  is reached. In case of absentm indedness the 
behavior com ponent is activated  e a c h  t im e  the inform ation set is reached. This is 
the opinion advocated (or a t least used) in all the  papers considered. O therw ise the 
absentm inded driver paradox would disappear anyhow, because only the  pure s tra te ­
gies ‘always ex it’ or ‘always continue’ and its m ixtures would rem ain. Note, however, 
th a t this kind of im plem entation weakens the sta tem ent th a t the same action is cho­
sen in all nodes of an inform ation set. B ut, we keep a t least th a t the same chance 
mechanism  is used in all nodes of an inform ation set.
1 .4  T im in g  a n d  t im e  fu n c tio n s
A nother difference between behavior strategies and m ixed strategies is the possibility 
to  ‘postpone’ the decision about a behavior component for an inform ation set ‘till the 
inform ation set is reached'. In the last sentence we used the tim e-related expressions 
‘postpone’ and ‘till the  inform ation set is reached’. To use these term s sensefully 
we need a notion of tim e or sequentiality in the  decision tree. An initial notion of 
sequentiality  is given w ith the tree s truc tu re  (V ,A ,r ) :  node a is before node b if the  
p a th  from r  to  b contains node a. We want to  extend this notion to  inform ation sets. 
Therefore, we introduce the notion of timing  or time func tion .
A decision tree allows timing if there exists a time function T  : V  ^  IN  such th a t
(i) T (r) =  0, (ii) T  is constant in every inform ation set and  (iii) T  is stric tly  increasing 
along every path .
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From  th is definition follows im m ediately th a t decision problem s w ith absentminded­
ness do not allow tim ing. In a decision problem  w ith tim ing one m ay assume th a t the  
decisions in one inform ation set are executed simultaneously.
For any decision tree the  following algorithm  checks the  possibility of a tim e func­
tion. The idea of the  algorithm s is th a t a node v gets its ‘tim e value’ as soon as a ll 
predecessors (fathers) of the nodes in the same inform ation set X (v) have a tim e 
value.
We s ta r t w ith T (r) = 0 ,  t  = 1  and E : =  C h (r), the  set of successors (children) of r. 
Next, we look for points v G E  w ith the p roperty  v G C  or X (v), the  inform ation set 
containing v, is in E . For all nodes v w ith  th is p roperty  we define T  (v) =  t  and  we 
replace these nodes v w ith C h(v). Then the value of t  is increased w ith one un it and 
we repeat the  operation. After a while the  algorithm  stops because (a) E  =  0 and 
T (v) has been defined for all v G V  or because (b) E  =  0 b u t there is no node v w ith 
the  required property. In th a t case no tim e function is possible. We have to  prove the 
last statem ent.
P ro o f :  Assume the algorithm  stops and x 1 G E . Then there is a node y 1 /  E  
w ith y 1 G X (x 1), the inform ation set containing x 1. Follow the p a th  from y 1 to  the 
roo t r  till a point in E  is found and call th is node x 2. There is a node y2 /  E  w ith 
y2 G X  (x2). Continuing in this way, we find after a while a repetition  x k =  x¡ and 
k < l. Every tim e function would give to  x j  and yj the  same value and to  yj a higher 
value th an  to  xj+1 for k < j  < l — 1. B u t since x k =  x¡, they  have the same value. 
Hence, there is no tim e function. <
For decision problem s w ith perfect recall there always exists a tim e function.1
P ro o f :  (See figure 1) Suppose there is no tim e function. T hen th! algorithm  stops 
w ith E  =  0. Take v G E .  The father v' of v is in an inform ation set X ( v ' )  where T  
has been defined already (this is the reason why v G E ). Let w G X (v) and w G E  
(w exists because, otherwise, X (v) Ç E ). If we take the p a th  from w  to  the root, 
th is p a th  contains a node of X ( v ' )  (perfect recall). Call th is point w ' . This is not the 
father of w  (otherwise w G E )  and T  (w') =  T  (v'). So, there is a node w '', the  father 
of w , between w ' and w . The p a th  from v to  the roo t intersects X (w ' ' ) (perfect recall) 
in the point, say v'' . This cannot happen  between v' and v and therefore, it m ust 
have been happened before v ' . Then T(v '')  has been defined and T (w '')  has not. B ut
1 The following argument is no longer valid for extensive form games with perfect recall, as perfect recall 
only requires ‘time consistency’ for information sets of the same player and not for all information sets.
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T  is only defined on complete inform ation sets.
C
v" o o w
0 w. t t
v O O  w 3 0 0 4
Figure 1 Figure 2: Im perfect recall w ith tim ing (Exam ple 2 of P  & R)
R e m a r k  If a decision problem  allows tim ing, one can change the decision problem  
in an inessential way to  ob tain  a decision problem  in which all term inal pa ths have 
equal length. If the  tim e param eter increases w ith more th an  one un it along an arc, 
one can introduce inessential chance nodes in between such th a t a t every integer tim e 
m om ent the  process is in a node. T he same one can do if there are term inal nodes 
w ith a lower tim e param eter th an  the m axim al tim e param eter m axveV T (v). Delay 
the payoffs till the  tim e param eter is m axveV T (v) and pu t inessential chance nodes 
in between. If this has been done, { IP(v ,b )}T(v)=t is a probability  d istribu tion  for 
every t  G [0 , m ax T (v)] and every behavior s tra tegy  b.
N ote th a t also some problem s w ith im perfect recall allow tim ing (see Piccione and 
R ubinstein, exam ple 2, see figure 2). The decision problem  in G ilboa (1997) does not 
allow tim ing, although there is no absentm indedness3 (see figure 6).
W a rn in g : If tim ing is not possible, the  words related  to  the concept of tim e like 
“postpone” , “previous” , “sim ultaneous” and “subsequent moves” m ust be used very 
carefully. T hey can only be used for nodes, not for inform ation sets.
1 .5  D e v ia t io n s  a n d  t im e  c o n s is te n c ie s
If we are dealing w ith a decision problem  without absentmindedness and a behavior 
s tra tegy  b =  {bx } x ei  is given (bx  is a p robability  d istribu tion  over the set M (X ), 
the set of moves in X ), it is possible to  speak about ‘deviating from the behavior rule 
in some inform ation set X '. To be more explicit, the  com ponents bY  of b w ith Y  =  X
Even if the twins are merged.3
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and the chance moves Ye defines the chance that a node x  G X  is reached : IP (x, b—X  ). 
These chances do not add up to  one, as there m ay be parallel pa th s (not intersecting 
X ), followed w ith positive chance. These chances are n o t  subjective probabilities or 
beliefs bu t uniquely determ ined by b—X  and  Ye w ith c G C, and thereby objective 
probabilities
Furtherm ore, for every node x  G X  and for every move m  G M (X ), the behavior 
s tra tegy  b—X  and the  chance moves determ ine a lo tte ry  over Z : L ( x ,b —X ,m ) .  The 
chance th a t a node z is reached is the product of the chances th a t along the p a th  from 
x  via m  the  right decisions are taken  to  reach z . I t is well defined (i.e., independent 
from bX ) because, after m, the inform ation set X  is not crossed for the second time. 
If we denote the  expected u tility  of L(x , b—X , m )  by U(x, b—X , m), we can assign to  
each move m  G M  (X  ) the expected u tility  of the  com pound lo ttery
m  G M  ( X  ) ^  IP (x, b—X  ) U (x, b—X , m )  = : 1EU (b—X , m).
xeX
The decision m aker is inclined to  change his behavior com ponent bX , if it pu ts a 
positive weight on a move m  th a t does not maximize the expected u tility  E U (b—X , m).
A  behavior s tra tegy  b is time consistent in  X  if the  behavior com ponent pu ts only 
positive weights on moves w ith m axim al E U ( b —X , m ). If this is true  for every infor­
m ation set X , we call the  behavior s tra tegy  b time consistent in  each information  
set.
Note th a t we are talking about changing the behavior in ju s t one inform ation set. 
A n o ther kind of deviation allows the decision m aker to  change the current decision 
and all ‘fu ture ' decisions. Here we get a different (stronger) type of tim e consistency. 
The use of the tim e-related expression ‘future decisions' makes clear th a t the decision 
m aker should know w hat are the ‘future decisions'. This is the place where ‘tim ing ' 
becomes an im portan t property. If no tim ing is possible, it makes no sense to  speak 
about ‘future decisions' or ‘future inform ation sets'.
In a decision problem  with timing  an inform ation set Y  follows the  inform ation set X  
if there is a p a th  from the root to  a t least one node of Y  th a t intersects X . I t is not 
necessary th a t  every node in Y  has this property. So, it is allowed th a t some point(s) 
of Y  can be reached from r  w ithout intersecting X . If the  decision problem  exhibits 
perfect recall, then  the stronger condition— every p a th  from r  to  Y  intersects X — 
follows autom atically. We denote the  collection consisting of X  and all inform ation 
sets following X  by J X . Now the  decision m aker can delete the com ponents bY  w ith
11
Y  G J X  and take new decisions in J X . We denote the  behavior s tra tegy  w ith the 
decisions in J X  deleted by b—j x .
For all nodes v in X  and m aybe also for some nodes in inform ation sets th a t follow 
X  the chance to  reach v is not dependent on b j X. This is the  case if only the last 
point of the  p a th  from r  to  v is in X  or an inform ation set following X . Then, 
HP (v,b) =  IP (v ,b—J x  ) . So, we m ay consider the new decision problem  consisting of 
the  inform ation set X  and the inform ation sets th a t follow X . We add a chance node 
co, connected w ith all nodes v for which IP(v, b—j x  ) is well-defined and define Ye0 by 
Ye0 (co ^  v): =  IP(v, b—j x  ). We call the new decision problem  the subproblem from  X  
downward, induced by b—j x . Note th a t the sum  of the  probabilities of Ye0 m ight be 
less th an  one. If the sum  is not zero, one can, if one wishes,4 m ultiply the probabilities 
w ith a positive factor to  make the sum  one. I t makes no difference for the  (optimal) 
decisions in the subproblem  bu t ‘u pda ting ' has the disadvantage th a t the  expected 
u tility  levels of the  subproblem  can no longer be com pared w ith the u tility  level(s) 
outside X . The contributions from X  downward are overweighted.
A behavior stra tegy  b is time consistent in  downward direction from X  on if b jx  is 
optim al in the subproblem  induced by b—j x . A behavior s tra tegy  b is called time 
consistent in downward direction if it is tim e consistent in downward direction from 
every inform ation set X  on.
These two kinds of deviations make sense bu t changing the behavior rule b everywhere 
bu t keeping the beliefs as if b is used, does not make sense (see e.g., the  definition of 
time consistency in Piccione and Rubinstein and B attigalli (1997)).
If X  is an inform ation set with absentmindedness, IP (x ,b—X ) is only defined in the 
‘upper frontier' of X  (the points x  G X  where some p a th  from the root r  enters X  
for the  first tim e) and E U  ( x ,m ,b —X ) can only be defined in the ‘lower frontier' of 
X  (the points from where no p a th  to  a (reacheable) term inal node does intersect X  
anym ore). The decision m aker cannot distinguish the points in the upper frontier, the 
lower frontier and the  points in-between. Nevertheless the upper frontier is a crucial 
concept in H alpern 's Game Tree Time Consistency (H alpern (1997), p. 79). To define 
tim e consistency in decision trees w ith absentm indedness one m ust assume th a t the 
behavior com ponent bX is followed during a p a rt of the  decision process inside X . 
So, the deviation m ust take place inside the inform ation set X . This is a com pletely 
different kind of deviation and tim e consistency. In one inform ation set there are now
Some people become nervous, when chances do not add up to one.4
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two or more behavior com ponents. If we allow such deviations, in different nodes of 
an inform ation set different chance mechanisms  are used. Here the feasibility problem 
arises: ‘Is it in accordance w ith the spirit of the  model to  deviate in the middle of an 
inform ation set'. The least th a t can be said is th a t we are leaving the set of behavior 
strategies, if we allow such deviations!
1.6 O p t im a l  d e c is io n s
As said before it is the task  of a decision m aker to  find a decision rule th a t maximizes 
the expected u tility  of the  outcom e w ithin the set of feasible decision rules. For the 
m om ent we assume th a t the set B  of behavior strategies is the  set of feasible decision 
rules.
In general an optim al behavior stra tegy  can be found  by a com bination of forward  
and backward induction . Forw ard induction (reasoning about the past) enables an 
assessment of probabilities in each of the inform ation sets; by backw ard induction 
(reasoning about the  future) the decision m aker can make a well-founded choice from 
the available moves in an inform ation set. In decision problem s w ith perfect recall the  
first p a rt is not dependent on the past (see Proposition 2) and a backw ard induction 
reasoning solves the problem. In a decision problem  w ith im perfect inform ation bu t 
w ith tim ing the probabilities are uniquely determ ined by previous chance moves and 
previous decisions, m ade by the  decision m aker i.e., by the  past.
If the decision m aker has, in an inform ation set, these well-founded beliefs about the 
decision node where he is, he has to  make a choice from the  available moves. To 
be able to  do so, he should know the consequences of each of the possible moves. 
Here the backw ard induction reasoning s ta rts . If (some of) the possible moves lead 
to  a new decision node, the decision m aker m ust know w hat he will do in each of 
these nodes. He m ust anticipate his future decisions. If, however, the moves in the 
present inform ation set also lead to  inform ation sets w ith im perfect inform ation, the 
usual circularity appears: to  decide in the  present inform ation set requires knowledge 
about future decisions and to  anticipate future decisions the  present decision m ust 
be known (to  assess well-founded beliefs). In problem s w ithout absentm indedness the  
trad itional way-out is to  take a t the  same tim e (a) a behavior strategy b =  {bX }X e j ,
i.e., a random izing s tra tegy  for each of the inform ation sets X , and (ii) a probability  
vector in each inform ation set X  : i  =  { i X }X e j . The behavior s tra tegy  b and the 
belief vectors i  are called consistent (fit together) if 
i X  is proportional to  the chance vector {IP(x, b—X )}xeX and
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bX maximizes o x  G A (M (X )) xeX i ( x )  Y meM(X ) aX (m) E U (x,b—X , m ) .
The behavior s tra tegy  is a fixed point in the  process of reconsidering. This is the 
concept of tim e-consistency in every inform ation set, as in troduced in subsection 1.5.
R e m a rk :  The ‘belief' i X  is the formal Bayesian update  of the probabilities to  
‘reach' the node x  if b—X  is applied, { IP (x ,b—X )}xeX . Therefore, i X (x) adm its the 
in terp re ta tion  ‘the probability  th a t x  is reached under the condition th a t X  is reached 
and b is applied ' if and only if the  events ‘x is reached under b—X ' are disjoint. This 
is the case if and only if the  inform ation set X  exhibits no absentm indedness. The 
transition  from this in terp re ta tion  of i X  to  the  in terp re ta tion  ‘being in x  under the 
condition of being in X ' is based on the  frequentistic in terp re ta tion  of probabilities. 
R epeat the  stochastic process b—X  several tim es and count how often you are in x  if 
you finish in X . In case of absentm indedness the Bayesian update  of {IP (x ,b )}xeX  
is meaningless and identifying the ‘form al' upd a te  of { IP (x ,b )}xeX  w ith  { i X (x)} 
needs justification. The frequentistic justification will not suffice, as the events ‘being 
in x ' are not defined in a dynam ical context and the events ‘reaching x ' are not 
disjoint. U pdating  makes them  disjoint in an artificial way. Piccione and R ubinstein 
(1997) and H alpern (1997) use this argum ent, nevertheless; the la tte r au thor w ith 
some hesitation. In Figure 3 e.g., the probabilities of ‘reaching b', ‘reaching c' and 
‘reaching e ' are 0.5 bu t the  events ‘reaching c' and ‘reaching e' are the same. If we 
repeat the process 100.000 tim es and every time that we are in  X  =  {b, c, e} we look 
in which point we are, we m ay find e.g., 48,985 hits for b. T hen we find necessarily 
51,015 h its for c and for e. I t is sim ply wrong to  conclude th a t, if the  process is in 
X ,  the probability  to  be in 6 is j .  To see why, assume th a t the chance move a t a is 
im plem ented by taking a num ber n  from [1, . . . ,  100] at random  (equal probabilities) 
and going to  b if n  is odd and to  c if n  is even. In b we take the same num ber and go 
to  d if n 2 is odd (always the case and therefore an innocent action) and in c we go 
to  e if n 2 is even. “Bayesian updating” would give the silly result th a t  the num ber n  
is odd w ith chance is even w ith chance ^ and th a t n  as well as n 2 are even w ith 
chance
W hen so m any intelligent au thors assign to  the  Bayesian update  of {IP(x, b—X )}xeX 
the  m eaning of a subjective probability, there m ust be some tru th  in it. So, let us 
s ta r t again.
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dƒ o  o g t  =  3
b
( \ e  t  =  2
c t  =  1
t = 0
IP (t =  2) =  n 2
IP (t =  3) =  ns
IP (t =  1) =  n 1
Figure 3: W rong justification Figure 4: Right justification for updating
A fixed Bayesian s tra tegy  b generates a dynam ic process, also called b. I t says a t tim e 
t  =  0 the process is in the root, then  the chance m echanism  (given by br or the chance 
move Yr ) is executed and the  next m om ent the process is in node such-and such w ith 
chance so-and-so and so on. In th is dynam ical context there is no event ‘being in x ' 
or ‘being in X ' bu t only events like ‘being in x  (or X ) at time  t '  or ‘being in x  a t any 
tim e ' (‘reaching x ') are well defined. So, the  right events are [(x, t); b], “the process b is 
a t tim e t  in node x” . Furtherm ore, for every node x  there is one tim e m om ent t  =  t(x ) 
such th a t [(x ,t); b] is logically possible (not excluded by the decision tree). The set 
X  m ust be replaced by the set of logically possible sta tes X ': =  { (x ,t(x ))  : x  G X }. 
The events [x,t] are autom atically  disjoint. W hat Grove and H alpern (1997) call the 
event ‘a t x ' seems to  be the event [x, t (x )]
I f  we assume that the dynamical process is inspected at time t, a m om ent in time 
chosen by a chance mechanism, independent of the decisions in  b, the  probability  th a t 
the  process is in x  a t tim e t  under the condition th a t (x, t) G X ' equals the Bayesian 
update  of {IP(x,b)IP(t  =  t(x ))} x£X. IP(x,b)  is the  probability  th a t ‘x is reached' 
and IP(t =  t(x )) is the probability  th a t we inspect the process a t tim e t  =  t(x ). If, 
moreover, the probabilities IP(t =  t(x )) are the same fo r  all values of t (x )  with x  G X , 
the  Bayesian update  of {IP(x, b)IP(t =  t(x ))} x£X and of {IP(x, b)}xeX  are the  same. 
Therefore, under the assumption that an external process chooses a time m om ent t  in  
the set o f  possible time moments {t(x): x  G X }} and each of these time moments has 
the same probability to be chosen, then  the  ‘formal Bayesian u p d a te ' of {IP(x, b)}xeX  
are the conditional probabilities of the event (x, t(x ))  under the  condition th a t one of 
the logically possible sta tes (x , t ( x ) )  w ith x  G X  is occurring.
The following example m ay clarify the situation  (see figure 4) . Suppose a dynam ic 
process b s ta rts  a t point a, and goes from there w ith probabilities p  and  1 — p  to  the
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points b or c, respectively. From  b the  process goes w ith probabilities q and  1 — q to  
d or e respectively. Let X  be the set {a ,b ,c ,d } .  Then t(a)  =  1, t(b) =  t(c) =  2 and 
t(d) =  t(e) =  3. Let us assume th a t the  tim e m om ent t  is chosen to  be t  =  i w ith 
probability  n  for i =  1, 2 and 3. The events (v ,t(v ))  have the probabilities n 1, n 2p, 
n 2 (1 — p), ns pq and  ns p(1 — q) for v =  a, b, c, d, e. The probabilities do not add up 
to  1, as we did not tell w hat happened a t t  =  3 if the  process was in c a t t  =  2. Let 
us assume th a t it leaves the  set X  w ith  certainty. If (and only if) n 1 =  n 2 =  n s , the
Bayesian upd ate  gives the  chances
1 p  1 — p pq
---------, --------- , ---------  and --------- .
pq +  2 pq  +  2 pq  +  2 pq  +  2
This is equal to  the  formal update  of {IP (reach v, b)}v e X .
For decision problem s w ith perfect recall one has the  surprising result th a t ‘fitting 
together' is enough for ‘optim ality '. I t is quite conceivable th a t the best continuation 
of ‘doing the wrong things (behaving suboptim ally)' is ‘doing the wrong th ings' and 
th a t s ta rting  w ith ‘doing the wrong th ings' is the best th ing  you can do if you will 
do it in the future. So, we rephrase the theorem  of H endon et al. (1996) for decision 
problems:
T h e o re m  3 I f  a decision problem has perfect recall, a behavior strategy is optimal 
i f  and only i f  i t  is time consistent in  every information set (also in  information sets 
reached with probability zero).
The theorem  says th a t in case of perfect recall the  agents can decide independently  
to  reach an optim al outcome. If the agents play a sequential equilibrium  in the ‘agent 
norm al form gam e', optim ality  is guaranteed.
For decision problem s w ith im perfect recall and especially for problem s w ith absent­
m indedness the  situation  changes completely. B oth  steps in the decision process (the 
assessment of probabilities and the choice of the  actions) m ust be reconsidered. B ut, 
before we come to  the decision m aking process an all im portan t question m ust be 
posed, nam ely the question about the feasibility of certain  decision rules. “W hat deci­
sion rules” is the question “can be im plem ented w ithout upsetting  the underlying idea 
of absentm indedness?” Also, in problem s w ith perfect recall we m eet th is problem: it 
is e.g. not allowed (not possible) to  make decisions, conditional to  being in a special 
node of an inform ation set. The decision cannot depend on inform ation (the model 
says th a t)  the decision m aker does not have. The advice “to  sell if stock prices will 
go down and to  buy if they  will go up” m ay be an optim al advice, it is certain ly  not
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a fe a s ib le  advice. From  our analysis of problem s w ith perfect recall we found th a t 
the optim al expected u tility  can be obtained by following a determ inistic behavior 
s tra tegy  and the feasibility of this kind of decision rules is beyond any doub t and, in 
fact, never questioned.
In decision problem s w ith im perfect recall the  feasibility problem  is a serious one, as 
some au thors are inclined to  ‘cheat a b it w ith the absentm indedness'. H alpern e.g., 
introduces an external process th a t chooses a node in an inform ation set as the only 
place where the decision m aker reconsiders his s tra tegy  (see the definition of PR -tim e 
consistency). This is an extension of the model th a t A um ann et al.(1997) rejects. 
In Grove and H alpern (1997) the ‘expected u tility  paradox ' (p. 53, formula (1)) is 
based on the assum ption th a t the decision m aker takes different decisions (or a t least 
different considerations) in different points of one inform ation set.
1 .7  F o rm in g  b e lie fs  a n d  B a y e s ia n  u p d a t in g .
In Piccione and R ubinstein the  abilities of a decision m aker in an inform ation set are 
sum m arized as follows
he cannot distinguish the points  in the set he has reached. He can, however, make
inferences and form a belief.
And later
he forms beliefs about the histories which led to it  (the information set). These  
beliefs
are the basis for his considerations.
The au thors are rem arkably silent about this ability ‘to  form beliefs'5 and  this hurts 
because the beliefs are im portan t as ‘basis for his considerations' (choice of actions, 
we suppose). In the analysis of the  absentm inded driver story  (see next section) the  
‘beliefs to  be a t the first or the second crossing' are ju s t dropped. They come from the 
blue sky bu t it is ‘the  basis for further considerations'. If the  beliefs are wrong, the 
following considerations m ight be wrong. As long as the decision m aker takes the  right 
decisions his beliefs and considerations are im m aterial. His beliefs are only im portan t 
in as far as they  explain why the decision maker took the decisions he has taken  or 
as a mean to find optimal decisions. A decision m aker is not obliged to  form beliefs 
bu t if he does, he should tell where his beliefs come from. He m ust have well founded  
beliefs. A um ann et al. find the foundations for their beliefs in two observations: (i) 
the  stochastical tim e m om ent t  has value 1 or 2, each w ith probability  0.5 (this fact
5 and most authors are
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is used in the  appendix to  derive the conditional expected u tility  formula h(p, q)) and
(ii) up to  the  m om ent t  the  stra tegy  q is played. Based on these two observations the 
beliefs are no longer beliefs bu t objective probabilities. One can argue th a t in decision 
problem s (in con trast w ith extensive form games) ‘beliefs' do not occur or make no 
sense. They are chances (objective probabilities) or they  are based on nothing. If one 
does not know, one should not pretend  to  know.
Bayesian updating  is an o ther subject where problem s can arise (see the rem ark in 
subsection 1.6). I t is a m ethod to  get new probabilities from old probabilities and the 
theory  says th a t it only gives m eaningful results if the events th a t occur are disjoint. 
Of course, the arithm etical exercise can be perform ed in more situations (as long as 
dividing by zero is avoided) bu t the  results lose their meaning. Moreover, it is quite 
often not necessary to  update  chances, even if it is allowed. A draw back of updating  
is th a t expected utilities after updating  cannot be com pared w ith expected utilities 
before updating. This is one of the m istakes Piccione and R ubinstein make.
2. T h e  A b s e n tm in d e d  D r iv e r .
Let us first repeat a slightly generalized version of the absentminded driver story.
E x a m p le  1. (the absentm inded driver; see Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) for 
n  =  2 and A um ann et al. (1997“) for n  =  3)
After a visit to  a bar a decision m aker has to  make an a ttem p t to  get home. To reach 
his home he (knows th a t he) m ust follow the highway and to  take the (say) p -th  exit. 
If he takes a different exit or no exit a t all, he comes into a situation  th a t has a 
lower u tility  th an  by ‘tak ing  the p -th  exit'. The highway has n  crossings, called C 1, 
C2 up to  Cn and tak ing  the j -th  exit leads to  the term inal node Z j . Never taking 
an exit leads to  Zn+1 =  M . The decision m aker knows th a t, if he is on the highway, 
he cannot distinguish the crossings C j . Or to  say it technically, all crossings together 
form one inform ation set. The term inal nodes Z j  give the decision m aker a u tility  of 
Uj . Accordingly, a t each decision node Cj (j > 1) the  decision m aker has two options 
H  (to follow the highway) and E  (to choose the present exit). In the bar (B) he has 
only the option H . In Piccione and R ubinstein (1997) the num bers are n  =  2, p  =  2 
and u  =  (u 1,u 2,u s ) =  (0, 4, 1). In A um ann et al. (1997“) the num bers are n  =  3, 
p  =  3 and the utilities are u  =  (7, 0, 22, 2) (see figure 5). We assume th a t neither Z 1 
nor Zn+1 has the highest u tility  (otherwise the problem  is trivial).
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Figure 5: The absentm inded driver.
As usual, the  question is w hat course of action the decision m aker should choose 
to  maximize his (expected) utility. B ut, a question th a t m ust be answered before 
is “W hat course of action can be chosen” or “W hat are the  feasible action plans, 
com patible w ith the (spirit of the) model ?” . Piccione and Rubinstein s ta r t w ith only 
two strategies Hn and  E n : always following the  highway and ending up in Zn+1 or 
(always) leaving the highway which ends in the term inal node Z 1. So, the  m axim um  
of u 1 and  u n+1 can be ob tained by a determ inistic strategy. If also behavior strategies 
are allowed, the set of feasible actions is extended to  the  1-dim ensional set consisting 
of the strategies [p : 1 — p]n w ith  O <  p < 1: a t each crossings the option H is chosen 
w ith chance p  and the option E  w ith chance 1 — p. I t is not necessary to  distinguish 
the different crossings to  im plem ent th is strategy. B u t the decision m aker m ust be 
equipped w ith a ‘[p : 1 — p]-random izer’ th a t perform s its du ty  a t each crossing. 
Thereby, the  random izer is also, a t some extent, the  decision m akers’ memory. The 
decision m aker knows at each crossing the behavior strategy he is performing: he re­
members his strategy. In the subsequent discussion we will assume th a t  the s tra tegy  is 
im plem ented by the following device: the decision m aker hires a tax i (anyhow better, 
when leaving a bar), installs a ‘[p : 1 — p]-random izer’ on the dashboard  and instructs 
the driver to  leave the highway as soon as the  display shows EX IT. This is a less 
fu turistic version of the au tom atic car of A um ann et al. (1997). The outcom e of this 
s tra tegy  is a lottery:
u n
1 2
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[(1 — p) : Z 1] © [p(1 — p) : Z 2] ©■■■© [pn 1(1 — p) : Zn] © [pn : Z n+ 1].
n
Therefore, m aximizing the function F  : p G [0 ,1] ^  E p % 1 (1 — p) u 1 +  p n un+1
i=1
solves the problem . In Piccione and R ubinstein’s example (P & R from now on) p* =  |  
is the  unique optim al solution, yielding an expected u tility  of | .  In A um ann et al. 
(AHP), p* =  0 is the  optim al solution w ith u tility  level 7. In the  first case the extension 
of the set of feasible action plans gives an increase of the m axim al expected payof. 
One could call th is the Small Absentminded Driver Paradox , as th is phenom enon does 
not occur in problem s w ithout absentm indedness (see the C orollary of P roposition 1 
and the Theorem  of Isbell (1957) as quoted in Piccione and R ubinstein, Proposition 
3).
So far, Piccione and R ubinstein and the reactions by Grove and  Halpern, Lipman, 
Halpern, Battigalli, G ilboa and A um ann, H art and P erry  (all in the same (1997)- 
volume of Games and Economic Behavior) agree. The next extension of the set of 
feasible strategies, in troduced by Piccione and R ubinstein and by which they  construct 
their Absentminded Driver Paradox is the possibility to  reconsider the chosen behavior 
strategy at some stochastically chosen time m om ent t  (t  =  1, 2, .. . n). This is our 
in terp re ta tion  of the  am biguous sentence in P  & R:
Reaching the intersection the driver will form beliefs.
The decision m aker follows a behavior s tra tegy  [p : 1 — p]n up  to  a stochastically  
chosen tim e m om ent t , a t tim e t  he ‘reconsiders’ his s tra tegy  choice and is allowed 
to deviate . Only the last p a rt of the  sentence describes the  extension of the stra tegy  
space. Only reconsidering w ithout deviating m ay make you feel sorry  (cf. A um ann et 
al. (1997“)) bu t does not change your expected utility. To be a complete description 
of the set of new strategies we still miss the  p a rt th a t describes the  kind of deviations 
th a t  are allowed. We re tu rn  to  th is issue in due time.
T im e  inconsistency  occurs, when the decision m aker has reasons to  change his course 
of action. The A bsentm inded Driver Paradox lies in the  fact th a t it m ay be worthwhile 
to  reconsider and deviate (although no new inform ation has been obtained). The 
question is, if this can happen.
P r e l im in a r y  R e m a rk s :  (i) If the decision m aker does not take the optim al 
decision rule from the available decision rules , it is common sense th a t he wishes to  
reconsider, if he can, and feel sorry, if he cannot. This emphasizes, once again, the 
im portance of the feasibility problem.
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(ii) Furtherm ore, the  wish to  deviate halfway seems to  be natural, as the  decision 
m aker w ants to  im itate the  perfect inform ation-optim al s tra tegy  H p * E  as close as 
possible, given his absentm indedness.
A um ann et al. (1997“) m ainly consider the  question if optim al behavior strategies are 
tim e consistent. They consider one kind of deviations and do not pose (or answer) the 
question if a ‘reconsidering s tra teg y ’ could be be tte r. G ilboa (1997) transform s the P 
& R-exam ple into a 2-agent strategic game w ith im perfect inform ation and identical 
payoff functions and claims it to  be an equivalent p resentation of the problem . Lipm an 
(1997) th inks th a t b o th  approaches are equivalent . We do not agree (see section 5, 
point (iii)).
3. A n a ly s is  o f  t h e  a b s e n tm in d e d  d r iv e r .
Let us analyze the decision m aker’s problem  a t the stochastically  chosen tim e m om ent 
t  .
According to  good trad itions of decision theory  this decision problem  can be split up 
into two steps:
(i) Assign (by reasoning about the past: forward induction) probabilities 
a 1, a 2, . . . a n to  the  events E (C 1), E (C 2), . . .  E (C n ),
being a t tim e t  in C 1, C2, . . . C n , respectively.
(ii) Choose (by reasoning about the  future: backw ard induction) the  m ost prof­
itable action (H  or E ) i.e. the action th a t gives the highest expected payoff.
As we shall see, bo th  steps require additional assum ptions about the decision m akers’ 
m em ory and abilities. P  & R (see Piccione and R ubinstein (19976) refuse to  make 
additional assum ptions bu t in the reactions several a ttem p ts  are m ade to  fill the 
holes in the  model.
(i) A sse s s in g  p ro b a b i l i t ie s
Let ni , i = 1 , . . . , n  be the  probability  th a t t  =  i. Note th a t n 1 +  ■ ■■ +  nn need not be 
1; an additional option could be t  =  n  + 1  (too late to  reconsider). If the  behavior rule 
used before t  is given by [p : 1 — p] (and the probabilities nj  and  p  are im plem ented by 
independent chance mechanisms), the  chance to  be a t crossing Cj a t the m om ent t  is 
nj p j - 1 . The probability  to  be a t the term inal node Z j  is ^k] p j 1 (1 — p).
k>j
Therefore, the probability  a j  to  be a t the crossing C j , conditional to the fac t that up 
to the m om ent t  the rule [p : 1 — p ]T-1 has been followed , is 
(^ 1, ^ 2p, ■ ■ ■ n n p n -1 ).
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The num bers a.j are not ‘beliefs’ bu t objective probabilities, in as far as the proba­
bilities nj  are objective probabilities (results of an independent chance mechanism). 
Piccione and R ubinstein (1997) calls the  num bers a  =  a 1 and 1 — a  =  a 2 subjective 
probabilities (beliefs), no value is excluded in advance and  no reason is given why the 
driver has these beliefs. Probabilities, derived in the way we did, are called consistent 
beliefs. Aum ann, H art and P erry  (1997) argue (and we th ink  they  are right) th a t only 
consistent beliefs are well-founded and th a t only the values n 1 =  ■ ■ ■ =  nn do fully 
right to  the  absentm indedness assum ption. They also find probabilities w ith the same 
proportions as we did. In the P  & R example they  find a  =  because they  apply 
Bayesian updating. 6
In  the remaining pari of the paper we assume that 7r¿ =  ^  fo r  all i with 0 <  7r <  1. 
Mostly we take n  =  1.
C o n c lu s io n : I f  the decision maker knows the probabilities 7tj = j  =  1, .. ., n  
(the probabilities that takes the absentmindedness seriously) and remembers his pre­
meditated action [p : 1 — p\, he m ust  assess the probabilities a  =  — (1 , p, - -  ■pn~ 1)
n
to the events ‘being in  Cj at time t  ’.
(ii) C h o o s in g  th e  o p t im a l  a c t io n
Suppose we have assessed the  probabilities as above. T hen we come to  the second 
more com plicated decision: the choice between the actions H and E. Here the  future 
plays a role or, more precisely, w hat the decision m aker expects from the future. The 
option E gives a lo ttery
[a1 : Z 1] © [a2 : Z 2] © ■ ■ ■ © [an : Zn] 
and the option H gives the  lo ttery
[a1 : E (C 2)] © [a2 : E (C 3)] © ■ ■ ■ © [an : Zn+1]
where E (C j  ) is the event th a t the tax i is a t crossing Cj a t tim e t  +  1, a m om ent he 
does not deviate anymore. The decision m aker has to  decide which of the lotteries he 
prefers. To be able to  do so, the  decision m aker has to  assess reasonable u tility  values 
Uj to  the  events E ( C j ) for 2 <  j  < n, being a t m om ent t  +  1 a t crossing C j . 
R e m a rk :  Note th a t assessing the values of Uj is speculating about the  future
6 Because of Bayesian updating a restant of the paradox remains in the analysis of AHP. They restore the 
time consistency but still the expected utility is higher in the action stage than in the planning stage. The 
discussion about ‘feeling sorry or not’ (pp. 108—109) is a consequence of it. At the end of Section 4 we will 
discuss this point.
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but, w hatever the result m ay be, it m ust satisfy the inequalities m ink>j u k < Uj < 
m axk>j u k , as a ll  poten tia l outcom es are lotteries over the  outcom es Z j , . . . ,  Zn+ 1. 
In P  & R only the value of E (C 2) has to  be assessed and u 3 =  1 <  U2 <  4 =  u 2. 
Then the choice is between a lo tte ry  w ith expected u tility  2 p  and the lo ttery
[ I : £ ( C 2) ] © [ | : Z 3].
Therefore, the  move H is certain ly  the best choice if p  <  -  i.e., a  = a \  >  0.75. P 
& R sta te  th a t E  is the  best action for all a  < 1 and equally good as H for a  =  1. 
This shows, once again, th a t P  & R ’s analysis is m istaken (as A um ann et al. (1997“) 
noticed already).
Tim e inconsistency will occur if (a) p  =  0, (not surprising, as p  =  0 is the worst 
strategy. So the decision m aker is glad to  get the opportun ity  to  change his action),
(b) p  =  1 and U2 <  3 and (c) p G (0,1) and U2 =  3 p.
To say more about the values of Uj , j  > 2 (i.e., to  say more about the  future) we 
have to  stipu late  in w hat way the decision m aker can deviate from his initial s tra tegy  
[p : 1 — p]T -1 . There are a t least th ree possibilities:
(i) At tim e t  the  decision m aker is allowed to  choose between (E) and (H) and in the 
future (if there is a future) the s tra tegy  [p : 1 — p]n-T  is resumed. The decision m aker 
takes the  decision only a t tim e t  in his own hands. This seems to  be the case th a t 
is investigated in A um ann et al. (1997“) and G ilboa (1997). W ith  small inessential 
differences it is the multiselves approach of Piccione and R ubinstein (1997), the 
modified multiself approach of B attigalli (1997) and modified multiself  approach of 
H alpern (1997).
(ii) At tim e t  the  decision m aker is allowed to  supplem ent [p : 1 — p ]T-1 w ith [r : 
1 — r]n-T  + 1 for any r G [0,1]: he is allowed to  change the odds of the random izer. This 
is the P R -tim e  consistency in H alpern (1997) and the time consistency of Piccione 
and Rubinstein.
(iii) At tim e t  the  decision maker is allowed to  choose between (E) and (H) a s  w ell 
a s  to  change the odds of the random izer.
The three possibilities can be m emorized by the following self-explaining notation:
1 — q], [p : 1 — p]n-T  case (i)1 — p]T 1, [q
1 — p]T-1, [r 1 — r]n -T + 1 case (ii)
[p : 1 — p]T-1, [q : 1 — q], [r : 1 — r]n-T  case (iii)
In the next section we repeat the analysis of the  absentm inded driver problem  under 
the  condition th a t action plans as m entioned in (i), (ii) and (iii) are fea s ib le . We will
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re tu rn  to  the  feasibility question la ter on.
4 . A n a ly s is  o f  t h e  a b s e n tm in d e d  d r iv e r  p ro b le m  (c o n tin u e d ) .
For k  =  1,. . . , n  + 1  we introduce the functions Fk: [0,1] ^  R  defined by
n -k
Fk (t ): =  t j  (1 — t ) u k+j +  t n k u n+1.
j=0
The functions Fk (t) is the expected utility, if we s ta r t in the point C k and the behavior 
s tra tegy  [t : 1 — t]n -k  is followed. The function F 1 = : F  is to  be m axim ized to  find the 
optim al behavior strategy. We order the possible sta tes in which the decision m aker is 
C 1, . . . , C n , Zn+1 =  M , Z 1, . . . , Z n . For t  G [0,1] the transition  m atrix  of the behavior 
rule [t : 1 — t] is given by the stochastic (2n  + 1) x (2n  +  1)-m atrix  X (t) (we deleted 
the node B):
c  1 c 2 . . . Cn M Zi z 2 .. Z n- 1 Z n
C\ 0 t  . . . 0 (1 - t )
C 2 0 t 0 (1 —t)
Cn-1 0 t 0 (1 —t)
Cn 0 t (1 - t )
M 1
Z i 0 1
z 2 0 1
Z n- 1 0 1
Z n 0 1
The incum bent s tra tegy  followed up to  the tim e m om ent t , [p : 1 — p]T 1 yields the
n
transition  m atrix  Yt ir^p):  = — X ( p ) t~ 1 +  (1 — 7r) X( p ) n .
n i=1
By left m ultiplication of the m atrix  Y (n, p)  to  the vector e =  (1,0, 0 , . . . ,  0) we get 
the chance vector e Y( n , p ) ,  giving the probabilities of being in the  different sta tes at 
tim e t . I t has the  coordinates:
P i C i ^ p )  =  - p i~ \  P ( Z i \ n , p )  =  (1  -  —  ) p i- 1 ( l  - P ) ,  P ( M \ n , p )  =  
n n
(1 — n) p n .
So, a t the stochastic tim e m om ent t  we have a lo ttery
[ -  : ^ (C i) ]  ® [ - p :  E (C 2)] © • • • © [ - p : E (C n )\ 
n  n  n
24
n
and an already fixed u tility  ( 1 -------)p* 1 (1 — p) «¿ +  (1 — tt )p n u n+i-
1 n
If we choose (in the cases (i) and (iii)) the  option E  we ob tain  the lo ttery
nrn  _ _ rn  _ , _ _ rn  „_■> _ , . , .....  n
[— : Zi] 0  f— p  : Z 2] 0  • • • 0  [— p n 1 : Z n] w ith  expected u tility  — p % 1 u\. 
n  n  n  n i=1
The option H gives the lo ttery  [— : E ( C 2 )] © [— p ■ E{C^)] © • • • © [— p n 1 : M],
n  n  n
If we continue w ith [r : 1 — r]n - T , the  expected value of E (C j  ) is Fj (r). In case (i) we 
take r: =  p. In case (ii) the  expected value of E (C j  ) is Fj (r) too.
After these p reparations we can form ulate the decision problem s in the different cases: 
Case (i): the  decision a t tim e t  is between (we w rite only the  p a rt of the problem
n n
not yet settled  and delete the factor ^ ): p *_1 and E p % 1 F i+ 1(p).
If 5 3  p 1 1 (Fi+ 1(p) — u i ) > 0 , the  optim al choice is q = 1, the  option H,i-1
i=1 
n
i 1if p l 1 (F i+ 1(p) — u i ) < 0 the  optim al choice is q =  0, the  option E,
i=1
in case of equality  any choice is optim al.
To show the  relation between optim ality  and tim e consistency of a behavior strategy, 
we will prove:
n
P r o p o s i t io n  4 . (A um ann et al. (1997“)) The polynomial E p i-1  (F i+ 1(p) —
i=1
u i ) and the polynomial F ' (p) are the same.
n
P ro o f :  The derivative of F (t) =  t i - 1 (1 — t) u i +  t n u n+1 equals
i=1
n n
— 'y ] t l 1 ui  +  'y ] (i — 1) t l 2(1 — t) ui +  n t n 1 u n + 1.
i=1 i=2
We have to  prove th a t the second and th ird  term  of th is expression equals
n
E t i-1  F i+ 1(t).
i=1
The coefficient of u k, k < n  is the  polynom ial
^  t i-1  t k - i -1  (1 — t) =  (k — 1) t k-2 (1 — t). 
i<k
n
So, by the proposition, the  optim al choice is H, E  or A (H , E ) (any m ixture of H and 
E) if F'(p) > 0, <  0 or =  0, respectively. So p  =  0 is tim e consistent iff F '(0 )  <  0, 
p  G (0,1) is tim e consistent iff F'(p)  =  0 and p  =  1 is tim e consistent if F '(1 )  >  0.
The coefficient of u n+ 1 is n= 1 t i 1 t n i =  n t n 1!
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This means th a t optim al behavior strategies are always tim e consistent bu t th a t even 
the worst behavior s tra tegy  is tim e consistent, if it is a sta tio n ary  point of F . For the 
decision maker time consistency is not always a virtue  (as it is under perfect recall, 
see Theorem  3).
In  the P  & R example the decision is between 4 p  and [4(1 — p) +  p ] +  p  =  4 — 2 p. 
If we take n  = 1 ,  the to ta l expected payoff (the fixed p a rt is zero, as u 1 =  0) is 
^ m ax (4p, 4 — 2 p). We see th a t p  =  |  is the  unique tim e consistent s tra tegy  bu t 
also th a t (p,q) =  (0 , 1) and (1, 0 ) are (tim e inconsistent) strategies w ith the highest 
expected payoff 2. In the set of actions of type (i) these strategies are the best im itation 
of the perfect inform ation-optim al stra tegy  H 2 * E . One m ay be surprised th a t the 
worst behavior s tra tegy  p  =  0 can become the best, if th is kind of deviation is allowed. 
The following m ay explain th is point. The decision m aker ‘hopes’ th a t the  stra tegy  
p  =  0 will never be used and th a t  he can reconsider a t t  =  1. After reconsidering the 
(p =  0 )-stra tegy  is resum ed and now it has become the best action. So his only ‘fear’ 
is th a t  t  =  2 .
In A HP we m ust com pare 7 + 2 2 p 3 w ith (22p —20p 2)+ p  (22—20p ) + 2 p 2 =  44p —38p 2. 
Tim e consistency occurs iff p  =  0, p  = ^  and p  =  the same num bers as in AHP. 
The to ta l expected payoff is now, if we take n  =  1:
7 * |( 1  — p) +  0 * ¡ p  (1 - p )  +  Ì  (7 +  22p 2) +  Ì  [ f » ] +  
where F'(p)  =  —7 +  44p  — 60p 2 and  a+ =  m ax(a, 0). To determ ine the optim al choice 
for p  we have to  maximize the  function p  ^  7 — ^ p + ^ - p 2 + ^ p 3 + ^ [F'(p] + . 
Here we stop the  analysis because the com putation  in case (iii) will solve the  problem  
in case (i) and (iii) as well.
C o n c lu s io n  We find the same time consistent behavior strategies as A um ann  
et al. (1997“) but by a different reasoning. The optimal behavior strategies are time 
consistent but there may be more time consistent behavior rules. Moreover, time in­
consistent decision rules often give better results.
Case (ii): We consider the  p a rt of the decision problem, not yet settled, and
n
maximize the function r  —> — p l~ 1 FAr)  over r  G [0,11.
n i=1
The result is, in general, a correspondence (m ultivalued function) p —— R(p). r  G R(p)  
m eans th a t r  is the  best continuation  of p. If p G R(p)  the behavior s tra tegy  p  is tim e 
consistent. If we apply this in P  & R, the function r  —>■ 5 [(4 r — 3 r 2) + p ( 4  — 3r)] 
is to  be maximized and we find R(p) =  § — ^ p .  The tim e consistent value for p  is 
the solution of the equation p  =  |  — \ p  i.e., p  =  | .  Here the num ber 1 — p  =  |  (in
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Piccione and R ubinstein) comes show up. The optim al tim e inconsistent strategy, the 
behavior s tra tegy  p  th a t maximixes p  —>■ 5 [(4 r — 3 r 2) + p (4 — 3 r)]r= ^(p), is p  =  1 
and r  =  The m axim al u tility  is | | ,  slightly m ore th a n  2.
C o n c lu s io n  T/ie mysterious number p  =  |  appears here as the unique time  
consistent behavior rule. In  pa,rticula,r, an optimal behavior rule is not necessarily 
time consistent, i f  this kind of deviations is considered.
Case (iii) In th is case we com pare the functions
n n
p  — p i-1 ui  w ith p —  m ax p 1-1 F i+ 1(r)]
1=1 re[0’1] 1=1 
to  find the optim al value for q. Then we have to  maximize over p  G [0,1] to  find the
optim al (tim e inconsistent) strategy. Tim e consistency occurs if p  =  q =  r .
For P  & R we find the following problems:
Maximize r —  (4 — 3 r ) + p :  the  result is r  =  0.
Com pare 4 p  w ith 4 +  p: the result is q = 1
and finally maximize over p  the expression ^(4 + p): the  result is p  =  1 and the 
maxim al u tility  is
This stra tegy  is the best im itation  of the  perfect inform ation-optim al stra tegy  H 2 * E . 
In case t  = 1  the payoff is 4 and in case t  =  2 it is 1.
In A HP we find the following series of problems:
Maximize r  —>■ (22 r(  1 — r) +  2 r 2 + p  (22 — 20 r) +  2 p 2: the  solution is R(p) = % ~ \ p -  
Com pare 7 +  22p 2 w ith [(22r — 2 0 r 2) + p  (22 — 2 0 r ) +  2 p 2]r=R(py. 
for p  =  ^  and p  = H  and E  are equally good. This give r  =  ^ and r  =  ^  and  no 
tim e consistency.
For p  G [yq, H is optim al and for the o ther values of p  E  is optim al.
For p =  1 followed by q =  0 and r =  | ¡  we find an optim al strategy. The value for r 
does not m a tte r b u t the value r = ^  has the  flavor of a ‘trem bling hand  perfectness’: 
if q = e > 0 is chosen by m istake, it is b e tte r to  choose r =  The optim al tim e 
inconsistent expected u tility  is 4^. B y choosing r = q = 0 or r  = p  we get the same 
expected u tility  b u t now by a deviations of type (ii) and (i), respectively. 
C o n c lu s io n  Again time inconsistent behavior is better than optimal behavior strate­
gies and optimal behavior strategies are not time consistent. N o t so surprising, time 
inconsistent plans of this kind give the best result. This kind of strategies fo rm  the set 
of the most versatile strategies of the cases (i), (ii) and (iii).
In the  example AHP there are, in case (i), three tim e consistent values for p, nam ely
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p =  0, p =  and p =  i .  In the paper of A um ann et al. there is a discussion th a t 
the decision m aker playing the optim al s tra tegy  p  =  0 ‘feel sorry (a t tim e t ) not to  
have played p  = ^ (pp. 108-109). Let us analyze the situation. At tim e r  we have the 
following probabilities (see table):
C 1 C 2 C 3 Z \  Z i  F i x e d  u t i l i t y +  U t i l i t y  from ‘e x i t ’
p =  0
p  = \
Ì  0  0  §  0  M
1 7 49 46 161 322 
3 90 2700 90 2700 90
1 1 1 1 1  7 
3 6 12 3 12 3
+  -  — 7^  3 1
+  Ü  =  6 -3 1
+  f  =  6.5
Playing ‘ex it’ (this is easier to  com pute bu t playing ‘continue’ gives the same expected 
payoff) for p  = ^  or p = ^ gives a u tility  of |  =  f§§§ and  5 +  i f  =  i f ,
respectively. There is no reason to  feel sorry not to  have played one of these strategies 
(see the to ta l u tility  in the  tabel). A um ann et al. come to  their result because they 
update  the not-yet-settled  utility. Then the last s tra tegy  gives 4^ * ^  >  7.
We conclude this section w ith a discussion of G ilboa (1997). G ilboa has an other incen­
tive to  reconsider the absentm inded driver story: he seeks to  avoid absentm indedness. 
He form ulates an alternative sto ry  he claims to  be equivalent w ith the  absentm inded 
driver problem . The decision m aker in his setting  is represented by two agents. To keep 
the idea ‘absentm indedness’ he takes three precautions: (i) the agents are “tw ins” or 
more precisely “identical tw ins” (ii) w ith equal probability  each of them  is called to  
act first and finally (iii) they  have to  choose the same action (as twins and certainly 
identical tw ins are supposed to  do). In the description of the “tw ins” G ilboa enters 
the psychopathology. He writes:
Each o f  them  thinks o f  herself, when called for a decision, as “the self”
and o f  her twin as “the other”......  she has a way to defìne herself and
thus she considers the tw in ’s decisions as independent o f  hers ......  the
two ‘’versions” o f  the agent cannot uniquely defìne themselves, ... each 
agent can defìne herself a t least at the time o f  her decision (which is the  
time o f  her glory)
It is hard  to  see why Gilboa takes all these precautions. Let us assume, the decision 
m aker takes two agents M ary and  John, no twins, not of the same gender and w ithout 
any iden tity  problem . M ary acts in inform ation set X Mary and John  in inform ation
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set Xjohn- Each of them  gets his instructions from the decision m aker and a chance 
move determ ines who is acting first and who is acting second. The two agents do not 
know the order in which they  are called for action as the decision tree shows (see 
figure 6).
C
Figure 6: G ilboa’s game.
Let us analyze the game. The two person game has th ree Nash equilibria nam ely 
p = q = ^ , p = l  and q =  0 and p =  0 and q =  1 (p is Johns action and q M ary’s 
action). The first equilibrium  is sym m etric and gives the payoff |  and  the o ther two 
equilibria give a payoff 2. We recognize the strategies and the payoffs: |  is the optim al 
behavior s tra tegy  payoff and 2 the payoff after an optim al deviation of type (i).7 In 
the  more generalized situation  we th ink  th a t the num ber of ‘crossing’ inform ation sets 
and the num ber of agents will increase dram atically. So we cannot see the advantage 
of G ilboa’s approach.
5. C o n c lu s io n s
(i) The absentm inded driver paradox exists in the sense th a t reconsidering and de­
viating a t a stochastic tim e m om ent gives a b e tte r  result. Phrased  in this way it is 
no longer a paradox: the best way to  im itate  the  perfect inform ation-optim al decision 
rule H p * E  is to  change your mind. To keep the idea of absentm indedness the  decision
The strategies (E,H) and (H,E) are the usual strategies for twins: one behaves well and the other behaves 
badly and they cannot be punished because the outside world has an ‘identity problem.’
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m aker m ust be able to  choose a tim e m om ent stochastically. I t is the question if this 
is possible. (see (vii)).
(ii) As already noticed by A um ann et al. (1997“), the analysis of Piccione and Ru­
binstein is flawed. According to  our analysis the  following should be changed:
(a) The events { C \ , t  =  1) has probability  the event (C*2, t  =  2) has probability  |  
and  ( Z i , t  =  2) has probability  , if the  incum bent s tra tegy  is p.
(b) It is not wise to  make a ‘Bayesian u p d a te ’ of these probabilities and to  com pare 
the unconditional m axim al expected payoff |  w ith  conditional expected payoffs. By 
doing so, the  worst event ( Z i , t  =  2) is ignored. No wonder th a t the expected payoff 
is higher.
(c) Even if updated  beliefs are considered, it is not true  th a t, for all a  < 1, ‘ex it’ is 
the best action (see Section 3).
(iii) The observation of L ipm an (1997) th a t G ilboa and A um ann et al. give the same 
analysis is not right. In A um ann et al. the  variables p  and q have an asym m etric 
interpretation  (the variable q, e.g., is the behavior rule used a t all other intersections, 
it is the ‘incum bent s tra teg y ’ and it does not m a tte r th a t in the P  & R-example there 
is only one o ther intersection.) I t is, therefore, not surprising th a t the variables p  
and q occur asym m etrically in their function h(p, q). In as far as A um ann et al. only 
investigate tim e consistency, this formula is fine and it covers our case (i). In G ilboa’s 
analysis the variables have a sym m etric in terp re ta tion  and occur symmetrically. We 
have the feeling th a t G ilboa’s 2-agent game is not an alternative form ulation of the 
same  decision problem . Moreover, the num ber of agents increases dram atically, when 
n  increases. By the way, the  variables p, q and r  in our analysis have clearly an 
asym m etric in terpretation : p  is the behavior rule before reconsidering, q a t tim e of 
reconsidering and r  thereafter.
(iv) In case (ii) the  (at least for us) m ysterious tim e consistent value |  comes show 
up, as the unique tim e consistent value for p  in case (ii).
(v) The cases (i) and (ii) in the  present paper are m ore or less equivalent w ith mul­
tiselves consistency and PR -consistency in Grove and H alpern (1997). ‘More or less’ 
because Grove and H alpern choose a t random  a node x  G X  where the decision maker 
reconsiders and we take a stochastical tim e moment.
(vi) I t is confusing th a t m ost of the  au thors delete the  node B and the move from B to 
C i. The decision m aker is ‘plunged into oblivion im m ediately’ and has no idea how to
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assess probabilities; everything is possible. If you do not know where you are, it is not 
a sound basis for decision m aking to  assume th a t you are a t any place w ith the same 
probability. So, here we have clearly a different problem . It should be noticed th a t 
also Piccione and R ubinstein give a picture (Exam ple 1) th a t is not in accordance 
w ith their story.
(vii) The question of feasibility is the last problem  to  reconsider. ‘Is it sufficient to  
keep the  idea of absentm indedness by saying th a t the  value of t  is stochastical w ith 
equal probabilities for the values of t  < n,  where reconsidering m atte rs  ? ’ A nd ‘how 
can the choice of t  be im plem ented ? ’
A suggestion for an answer to  the la tte r question could be found in an n -possibility 
variant of ‘tying kn o ts’ in A um ann et al. i.e., a circular device w ith n  positions (like 
a clock). At one position an alarm  goes bu t the  decision m aker does not know this 
position (otherwise he has an alarm  clock to  cure his absentm indedness). So, he pu ts 
the  indicator a t a position and pu ts it one step  farther a t each crossing. If the  alarm  
goes, he reconsiders and deviates, if neccessary, from the behavior s tra tegy  as in the  
cases (i), (ii) or (iii). Note th a t the choice for q and r  can also be pre-m editated  in 
the  ‘b a r’. This device is sufficient to  im plem ent each of the variants (i), (ii) and (iii). 
In case (i) the decision m aker takes the decision a t tim e t  in his own hands, in case
(ii) he pushes a b u tto n  th a t pu ts the odds in the random izer from p  to  r  and in case
(iii) he does both . We fear, however, th a t  th is device comes terrib ly  close to  an alarm  
clock. If the  actions (i), (ii) and (iii) (or more com plicated actions, like reconsidering 
a t several stochastic tim e m om ents) are judged infeasible, the absentm inded driver 
paradox disappears! It is curious to  see th a t  A um ann et al. reject the  idea of an 
external device th a t chooses t  =  1 and t  =  2 w ith equal chances bu t use the idea to  
derive the formula for h(p, q).
(viii) How sensitive the situation  is for adding some external devices or processes 
can be seen from the following s tra tegy  (th a t looks quite feasible): in the planning 
stage the decision m aker prepares n  + 1  behavior rules p 0, p 1 up to  p n and a chance 
mechanism  t  : (1 — t). At each crossing he takes the next behavior rule w ith probability  
t  and uses the  old behavior rule w ith probability  (1 — t). He does not need to  know 
which behavior rule he is using. For t  =  0 the behavior s tra tegy  p 0 is used all the  tim e 
bu t for t  =  1 the  decision m aker has w ith his s tra tegy  an built-in  alarm  clock if the 
k -th  exit is the right exit and he takes pi =  1 for i = 0 , . . . , k  — 1 and  p k =  0 .
R e fe re n c e s .
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